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ABSTRACT
Epidemics are emergent phenomena depending on the epidemiological characteristics of pathogens and the interaction and
movement of people. Public transit systems have provided much important information about the movement of people, but there
are also other means of transportation (e.g., bicycle and private car), that are invisible to public transit data. This discrepancy
can induce a bias in disease models that leads to mispredictions of epidemic growth (e.g., peak prevalence and time). In our
study, we aim to advance and compare the epidemic spreading dynamics using public transit trips, in contrast to more accurate
estimates of population movement using mobile phones traces. In our study, we simulate epidemic outbreaks in a cohort of two
million mobile phone users. We use a metapopulation model incorporating susceptible-infected-recovered dynamics to analyze
and compare different effective contract matrices, constructed by the public transit systems and mobile phones respectively,
on the process of epidemics. We find that epidemic outbreaks using public transit trips tend to be underestimated in terms
of the epidemic spreading dynamics, reaching epidemic peaks weaker and later. This is rooted in a later introduction of new
infectious people into uninfected locations.
Introduction
Despite the advances in medicine and technology, outbreaks of infectious diseases continue to occur, causing substantial losses
in both economy and human health. For example, in 2014, the Ebola epidemic spreading across Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, greatly impacted the societies and economies of West Africa1. In addition to 28,639 cases and 11,316 deaths, the
economic loss is estimated to be as high as USD 2.2 billion in 2015 GDP, leaving a declining agricultural production and
decreasing cross-border trade2–5. To relieve epidemic risks and reduce socio-economic losses, public health officials seek
model-based analyses to inform infectious disease threats (such as the size and time of the outbreak peak) and efficient response
strategies to contain and mitigate emerging outbreaks6.
Population movement and connectivity exacerbate epidemic transmission, deciding the fate of the propagation of the
epidemics7, 8 and the efficacy of public health control measures9–11. An appropriate example would be the spread of 2009 H1N1
pandemic in Mexico City12–15. Epidemic spreading does not only depend on the transmission mechanisms of the pathogens
in question but also population movements. To get a high-resolution picture of population movements, many technologies
have been used to obtain people’s trajectories through their digital footprints. In contrast with individual explosive electronic
records available in public transit systems, the position tracking via mobile phones can track nearly total population movements
(e.g. by foot, bicycle, and public transit) and give a more precise description of population movements during an epidemic16.
It is however more sensitive from a privacy perspective, which is a reason to keep public transportation data as a source for
epidemic modeling.
Fine-grained records of public transit are available in many cities, with public access (e.g., Chicago17 or Chinese cities
such as Chongqing and Shanghai soda.datashanghai.gov.cn, accessed April 2, 2018). There is a decades-old line of
research in the epidemiological literature to use this data as a proxy for analyzing the features of population movement18–23.
However, public transit systems can only track part of movements, dominant in long distance trips. For example, from a study
about travel within Shanghai, people tend to travel via public transit for a trip within one hour, but with car for longer journeys24.
Another Chinese study observed that trips within one kilometer were typically by foot, while people used public transportation
for longer trips25.
In this work, we aim to advance and compare the epidemic spreading dynamics using population movements captured by
different position tracking technologies (e.g. mobile phone26, 27 and public transit28, 29). The epidemic outbreaks are introduced
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Figure 1. Comparisons of simulated disease outbreaks using public transit or mobile phone data. People travel from
their origins to destinations using different means of transportation. Using mobile phone data as a basis for simulations could
give more accurate results.
into an urban network of locations, driven by population turnover in metapopulations at the location. The metapopulation
dynamics follows a susceptible-infected-recovered model30.
The population movements collected connect over two million mobile phone uses of the eight million inhabitants over one
day in Changchun, China in 2017. As we do not have access to public transportation data from Changchun, we use a model
to generate such. This model assumes a gamma distribution of trip distances31. We track simulated epidemics spreading in
epidemiological settings similar to the 2009 Hong Kong H1N1 influenza and 2010 Taiwan varicella epidemics32, as well as
other infectious diseases. We assume the pathogen is introduced in a location probabilistically with respect to its population
and follow the time evolution of prevalence for the different ways of tracking the populations. In Fig. 1, we show our proposed
analysis methods schematically.
Methods
In this section, we will introduce the epidemic model, how we deal with movement trips, and prevalence measures in the
following subsections. We summarize information about parameters in Table 1.
Epidemic model
The millions of inhabitants of a metropolis make individual-based epidemic models challenging33. Still one would want to
include the location and temporal features of a city in the calculation. One solution, and the one we take, is to represent
locations as metapopulations. We base our simulations on the work of Wesolowski et al.34. We divide the population into
three disease compartments: susceptible (individuals don’t have but could get the disease), infective (individuals who have the
disease and can spread it further) and recovered (individuals who are immune or deceased and cannot get or spread the disease).
For each location j, the number of individuals in the three compartments at time t are denoted by St, j, It, j and Rt, j, respectively.
In an entirely susceptible population at location j, a new outbreak happens with probability:
h(t, j) =
βSt, j(1− exp[−∑km j,kxt,kSt, j])
1+βSt, j
(1)
where β represents the transmission rate; m j,k is the population flow (i.e., the number of people traveling during one time unit)
from location k to location j; and xt,k is the fraction of the infected population at day t at location k
xt,k =
It,k
Nk
. (2)
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Table 1. Detailed information about parameters in our methods.
Parameters Meaning Range
St, j number of susceptible individuals at time t in location j [0,N j]
It, j number of infective individuals at time t in location j [0,N j]
Rt, j number of recovered individuals at time t in location j [0,N j]
β transmission rate [0.5, 15]
γ recovery rate [1/5,1]
mk j number of trips from location j to location k in a day
N j population of location j
M contact matrix using mobile phone trips
δ public transit average traveling distance [10,50]
µ public transit mode share 0.3
k shape parameter in the gamma distribution with respect to δ [1,50]
θ scale parameter in the gamma distribution with respect to δ [1,50]
d trip distance
F gamma probability distribution, Γ(k,θ), of public transit trips along with distances d
λ scale parameter to derive the ratio of public transit trips with respect to µ
Mµ contact matrix using public transit trips
Then we simulate a stochastic process introducing infections into completely susceptible metapopulations. It+1, j is a Bernoulli
random variable with probability h(t, j).
In locations with infections, the dynamics is deterministic:
St+1, j = St, j− βSt, jIt, jN j (3)
It+1, j = It, j+
βSt, jIt, j
N j
− γIt, j (4)
Rt+1, j = Rt, j+ γIt, j (5)
where γ denotes the recovery rate. An important parameter for the discussion is the basic reproduction number, R0. It is
defined as R0 = β/γ and can be interpreted as the expected number of secondary infections. More specifically, if an infectious
individual joins into a susceptible metapopulation. Everyone in such location has an equal probability to contract with other.
Contact network
The compartmental model described above is not the only component of an epidemic simulation. We also need to input the
contact patterns, which is used to describe who that is in contact with whom. In this section, we describe how we construct the
contact matrices that describe the flow of people between the locations within our example city—Changchun, China.
Trips inferred by mobile phone data
The dataset contains the movements of total of 6,305,500 anonymized mobile phone users in Changchun City during a one-day
period on July 3, 2017 (Monday). Fig. S1 shows the temporal number of changing trips in a day. We use a subset of over
2,035,700 anonymized mobile phone users, who only move within the studied city of Changchun. Changchun is the provincial
capital and largest city of the Jilin Province. This city had (in 2010) a total population of 7,674,439 under its jurisdiction and an
area of 20,604 km2. In total, the data comprise 3,789 cellular base stations (henceforth locations).
From the movement traces of these users, we construct hourly time series of locations, assuming one individual can only be
associated to one location (i.e. the one of longest duration) per hour. At the same time, we construct the contact matrix M,
where the entry mk j means the number of trips from location j to location k, by aggregating 24 hourly movements of all users.
The population of location j, N j, is assumed to be (m j j+∑km jk−∑kmk j)/24, where m j j are the number of local trips within
the location j.
We summarize some properties of this contact network in Table S1 and Fig. S2. The degree ki of the ith location is the sum
of in-degree and out-degree as (∑kmik+mki)−mii.
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Public transit trips
Even though, as mentioned, several metropolitan regions publish detailed data about public transport trips, Changchun does not
(at the moment of writing). Note that, there is a sufficient amount of statistics about the city and the intra city travel for us to
reconstruct the contact matrix.
We use some different attributes to model public transit trips and extract the distribution feature of trips: First, the average
travel distance by public transit, δ , is determined. In the city of Changchun, the average speed of public transit is expected to be
15.8 kilometers per hour in morning and evening rush periods in 201735. In our analysis, we investigate δ of three levels to
denote traveling trips for 1 to 3 hours: low δ is defined as in the range of 10–20 kilometers, mediate as 30–40 kilometers and
high as 50–60 kilometers. Next quantity we measure is the public transit mode share. Another attribute is the public transit
mode share, denoted µ—the fraction of public transit trips. According to the survey in Changchun urban area25, the public
transit mode share µ is estimated between 0.3 and 0.4. As thus we set µ as 0.35 in this study.
To generate public transit trips with accurate δ and µ , we use a realistic probability distribution F(d) of public transit
trips of distance d. We assume F(d) follows the gamma distribution—Γ(k,θ). Effectively, k dominates the shape whereas θ
dominates the scale. To understand the effect of δ on F(d), we use gamma distributions with mean value as δ . We scan the
integer values of the parameter space of k from two to fifty and θ from one to fifty. For example, consider the low δ , then
we choose all pairs of k and θ , giving a mean of Γ(k,θ) between 10 and 20. Totally, there are 29 pairs of k,θ -values for low
δ , 37 pairs for mediate δ , and 34 pairs for high δ . For each Γ(k,θ), λ is introduced explicitly to scale the probability when
deriving the fraction of public transit trips as µ . Finally, a trip is labeled as public transit with the probability of λΓ(k,θ).
By aggregating public transit trips, we can construct the contact matrix Mµ of public transit trips, the same process as that of
mobile phone trips.
Simulation setup and analysis
As epidemic outbreaks emerge, their transmission dynamics can vary substantially across the geographical locations of the
initial infection in large populations7, 8, which have been used to model epidemics in urban settings7, 18, 36. We make 100 runs
for averages. Each run starting from a location chosen with a probability proportional to its population. The outbreaks are
characterized by three parameters (the transmission rate β , the recovery γ , and the the average traveling distance δ ): β indicates
the probability of a susceptible individual infected in a contact by an infectious individual. γ’s inverse gives an expected
duration of the infectious state. Finally, δ parameterizes the public transit behavior of individuals. Simulations with parameter
settings of infectious diseases are studied: 2009 Hong Kong H1N1 influenza (β = 0.50 and γ = 1/3) and 2010 Taiwan varicella
(β = 1.55 and γ = 1/5)32, as well as a series of hypothetic infectious diseases. We simulate the hypothetic diseases by three
levels of transmission rates (low β = 2, mediate β = 5, high β = 15 and γ = 1)34. For example of a set of parameter settings
(i.e., β = 1/2, γ = 1/3 and low δ ), there are 29 pairs of k and θ with respect to low δ . For each pair of k and θ , we run
stochastic simulations 30 times using sampled public transit trips. With 100× (1+29+37+34)×30× (6+3) = 2,727,000
simulations, we assess these simulated prevalence time-series with respect to the following four comparisons:
• Early warning: The time lag, as tMPT1% − tPTT1% , between the prevalence with public transit trips (PTT) reaching 1%
prevalence at time tPTT1% and the prevalence with mobile phone trips (MPT) reaching 1% at time t
MPT
1% prevalence
36–38.
• Peak timing: The time lag, as tMPTpeak − tPTTpeak , between the prevalence with public transit trips reaching its epidemic peak at
time tPTTpeak and the prevalence with mobile phone trips reaching its epidemic peak at time at time t
PTT
peak
36.
• Peak magnitude: The ratio, as rPTTpeak/rMPTpeak , of peak prevalence rPTTpeak with public transit trips and that rMPTpeak with mobile
phone trips36.
• Situational awareness: The complement of the normalized mean absolute error (MAE) between prevalences of simulations
using public transit trips and that using mobile phone trips, minimized over possible lags36, given by:
1−min
λ
∑t |xt − yt+λ |
∑t |xt + yt+λ |
(6)
Here, xt and yt are the prevalence in simulations using public transit trips and that using mobile phone trips at time t,
respectively; λ is the time lag.
To track the epidemic growth rate of new infections in previous susceptible locations, we consider the dynamic percentage
of infected locations over time:
• Timing of #% locations infected: The time lag as lMPT1% − lPTT1% , between the prevalence with public transit reaching #%
locations infected at time lPTT1% and that l
MPT
1% with mobile phones.
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Results
Evaluation of prevalence time-series
As mentioned, we scan the β -γ parameter space. A typical epidemic starts with an initial infection at a random location. Except
the outbreak size, the epidemic growth can be additionally different. Considering an epidemic as shown in Fig. 2, prevalences
using public transit trips are increasing with time, with the peak at the 50th day and end at the 170th day, in contrast, that using
mobile phone trips peak at the 40th day.
The epidemic spread is closely tracked in epidemiological settings of 2009 Hong Kong H1N1 influenza (β = 0.5 and
γ = 1/3) and 2010 Taiwan varicella (β = 1.55 and γ = 1/5)32, as well as a series of synthetic, hypothetical infections. Infections
of disease outbreaks in urban settings may be detected in one day34. We further track the epidemic spread of synthetic infectious
diseases over transmission rates (low β = 2, mediate β = 5, and high β = 15).
Figs. 3 and 4 show the deviations of the simulations based on transit data from the mobile phone based reference. The
consistently negative times, shows that both the peak times and early warning times always happens later in the simulations
based on public transit data. The small peak magnitudes and situational awarenesses also shows a discrepancy between the
outbreaks estimated from the public transit trips and mobile phone trips. In general, one can regard the bias as coming from that
the simulations based on the public transit trips are more strongly affected by both R0 and the average traveling distance δ . For
example of low δ , when R0 = 7.75, the peak time of prevalence using public transit data is on average at the 17th day, and that
using mobile phone at the the 15th day. As thus, the peak timing, as the deviation of their peak times, is on average two days.
When R0 = 1.5, the peak time of prevalence using public transit data is on average at the 48th day, and that using mobile phone
at the the 44th day. The peak timing increases to an average of four days (Fig. 3A, 3B and 3C).
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Figure 2. Map of 3,789 locations in our metapopulation model and an example of typical epidemic curves with
parameters from the 2009 Hong Kong H1N1 Influenza Pandemic (low R0 = 1.5). In panel A, The horizontal (vertical)
axis denotes the latitudes (longitude) of locations. We initialize the outbreak by infecting the most populous location (star). The
movement pattern of public transit is featured by the mediate public transit average traveling distance (30–40 kilometers) and
the gamma distribution (k as two and θ as 16). In panel B, we show an example of a prevalence curve. Simulations based on
population movements from mobile phones peak at nearly the 40th day, while that from public transit at 50th day.
Theoretical network analysis
To better understand our observations, we investigate the difference in population flow as predicted by public transit and mobile
phone data, respectively. Suppose that an entirely infected location i of size Ni is connected to an entirely susceptible location j
of size N j. Considering this simple scenario, we can follow the network analysis of Ref. 39 to understand this effect of contact
matrices on epidemics. The probability Pji, that the disease is transmitted between an infected individual from the ith location
go to the jth location, is given by:
Pji = 1− lim
dt→0
(
1−
[
βm jin j
ni
]
dt
)γ/dt
= 1− exp
(−βγm jin j
ni
)
(7)
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Figure 3. Performance of two real infectious diseases with respect to early warning and peak timing (graphs A, B,
and C), and achieving peak magnitude and situational awareness (graphs D, E, and F). Points and error bars indicate the
mean and standard deviation in performance over simulations, respectively. We choose parameter values to reflect the 2009
Hong Kong H1N1 influenza (β = 0.5 and γ = 1/3) and 2010 Taiwan varicella (β = 1.55 a d γ = 1/5)32 marked by stars in
legend. We also include simulations for other parameter values representing other infectious diseases.
Where m ji denotes the movement flow as the number of trips from location i to location j per time—the entry of contact matrix
M. Thus the probability Θ ji that at least one infected individual of location i due to location j is given:
Θ ji = 1− exp(−βγm jin j) = lim
m ji→0
βγm jin j = lim
m ji→0
R0m jin j (8)
When m ji is small, the probability Θ ji can be linear with the term of R0m ji. As thus, Θ ji, as the probability of new infections
introduced in an entirely susceptible location, correlates positively with R0 and movement flow m ji.
For an infectious disease with fixed R0, comparing with the contact matrix M of mobile phone trips, the contact matrix Mµ
of public transit trips, with the entry of m ji, is scaled by µ and has different probability distributions. For example of mediate δ
as 30–40 kilometers (Fig.S3), 95% trips tracked by mobile phone are covered by a range from 0 to 153 kilometers. In contrast,
95% public transit data has a more narrow range (i.e. from 0 to 84 kilometers), only about half of the mobile phone data. These
differences contribute to the disparity of probability Θ ji to infect new locations in epidemic outbreaks.
Furthermore, we evaluate the kind deviation of epidemic prediction between the two types of movement data by considering
the expected first time of #% locations being infected. In Fig. 5, we track the spread of realistic infectious diseases (Fig. 3)
and hypothetic infectious diseases (Fig. 4). Negative times shows the slower epidemic growths using public transit trips. In
general, times are decreasing with increasing R0 and public transit average traveling distance δ . For ex mple, at th beginning,
simulations with public transit trips arrive around when 20% locations new infected later or earlier. With continued epidemics,
these simulations will arrive the time of 80% locations new infected later totally.
Conclusions
In computational epidemiology, a common proxy for population flow within cities is public transit data. In this work, we
compared such an approach with arguably more realistic data for population movement obtained from mobile phone locations.
Simulating outbreaks in several (realistic and hypothetical) scenarios, we found deviations depending on the type of population
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Figure 4. Performance of hypothetical infectious diseases with respect to early warning and peak timing (graphs A,
B, and C), and achieving peak magnitude an situational awareness (graphs D, E, and F). Points and error bars indicate
the mean and standard deviation in performance over simulations, respectively. We simulate hypothetical diseases with three
levels of transmission rates (low β = 2, mediate β = 5, and high β = 15) 34.In the simulated epidemic of each R0 and each
average traveling distance δ (low, mediate, and high), negative early warning and peak timing indicate the late arrival of peak
prevalence in simulations using public transit trips.
movement data we input. In the simulations based on public transit data, the peaks of outbreaks tended to arrive later and be
weaker. For example, for H1N1 to spread over a medium traveling distance (30–40 kilometers), prevalences using public transit
have can have five days delay and be 8% less of the peak when using cell phone data.
We trace the observed effect to a delayed spreading of new infections in totally susceptible locations. New infections driven
by public transit data tend to arrive late at an entirely susceptible population, especially for locations with a long distance, due
to the significantly reducing number of trips and appearance probability of long trips. We conclude that deviations of epidemic
prevalence using public transit decreased with increasing R0 and public transit average trav ling distance δ . This conclusion,
in general, could prove useful to public health policymakers, especially when there are only public transit information, and
can guide future tracking strategies to infer population movements. It also implies that some earlier literature needs to be
re-evaluated. For example of the epidemic risk relied on the public transit data in Tokyo21, with the public transit mode share as
57%40, the risk that a single infection causes Tokyo epidemic may be underestimated. With a low transmission rate β as 10−4
and a high work population as 104, the previous low probability of urban epidemic can be middle or even high, and the peak
time can arrive weeks earlier than the estimated two months.
Our work agrees with Ref. 33 in that we need a holistic picture of movements within a city. Future studies along this line
can either increase the precision in the population density and flow modeling41, introduce demographic data33, 42, or scale up
the modeling to the entire humanity23, 43.
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Figure 5. Epidemic growths of real (graphs A, B, and C) and synthetic (graphs D, E, and F) infectious diseases with
respect to timing of 80% and 20% locations new infected. Points and error bars indicate mean and standard deviation in
performance over simulations, respectively. We closely track the timing of #% locations new infected for real infectious
diseases (Fig. 3) and synthetic infectious diseases (Fig. 4). In the simulated epidemic of each R0 and each average traveling
distance δ (low, mediate, and high), The negative times indicates a predicted slower epidemic spreading using public transit
trips data in terms of incidence.
Table S1. Properties of the contact network with respect to mobile phone trips. Number N of different locations
generated E edges during T time steps. ∆t represents time units, 〈k〉 represents average degree, M represents modularity of the
contact network, estimated by the method of Louvain44 via 46 detected communities (a set of locations densely interconnected,
and with few connections to locations outside).
N E T 〈k〉 M
3946 1099422 1d 15285 0.89
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